History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0098/00984.txt

Text File | 1992-10-11 | 40KB | 646 lines

$Unique_ID{how00984}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Democracy In America
Chapter XIII: Government Of The Democarcy In America - Part II}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{De Tocqueville, Alexis}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{public
state
upon
expenditure
france
america
government
poor
states
union}
$Date{1899}
$Log{}
Title:       Democracy In America
Book:        Volume I
Author:      De Tocqueville, Alexis
Date:        1899
Translation: Reeve, Henry

Chapter XIII: Government Of The Democarcy In America - Part II

Instability Of The Administration In The United States

In America the public acts of a community frequently leave fewer traces than
the occurrences of a family - Newspapers the only historical remains -
Instability of the administration prejudicial to the art of government.

     The authority which public men possess in America is so brief, and they
are so soon commingled with the ever-changing population of the country, that
the acts of a community frequently leave fewer traces than the occurrences of
a private family.  The public administration is, so to speak, oral and
traditionary.  But little is committed to writing, and that little is wafted
away forever, like the leaves of the Sibyl, by the smallest breeze.

     The only historical remains in the United States are the newspapers; but
if a number be wanting, the chain of time is broken, and the present is
severed from the past.  I am convinced that in fifty years it will be more
difficult to collect authentic documents concerning the social condition of
the Americans at the present day than it is to find remains of the
administration of France during the Middle Ages; and if the United States were
ever invaded by barbarians, it would be necessary to have recourse to the
history of other nations in order to learn anything of the people which now
inhabits them.

     The instability of the administration has penetrated into the habits of
the people: it even appears to suit the general taste, and no one cares for
what occurred before his time.  No methodical system is pursued; no archives
are formed; and no documents are brought together when it would be very easy
to do so.  Where they exist, little store is set upon them; and I have amongst
my papers several original public documents which were given to me in answer
to some of my inquiries.  In America society seems to live from hand to mouth,
like an army in the field.  Nevertheless, the art of administration may
undoubtedly be ranked as a science, and no sciences can be improved if the
discoveries and observations of successive generations are not connected
together in the order in which they occur.  One man, in the short space of his
life remarks a fact; another conceives an idea; the former invents a means of
execution, the latter reduces a truth to a fixed proposition; and mankind
gathers the fruits of individual experience upon its way and gradually forms
the sciences.  But the persons who conduct the administration in America can
seldom afford any instruction to each other; and when they assume the
direction of society, they simply possess those attainments which are most
widely disseminated in the community, and no experience peculiar to
themselves.  Democracy, carried to its furthest limits, is therefore
prejudicial to the art of government; and for this reason it is better adapted
to a people already versed in the conduct of an administration than to a
nation which is uninitiated in public affairs.

     This remark, indeed, is not exclusively applicable to the science of
administration.  Although a democratic government is founded upon a very
simple and natural principle, it always presupposes the existence of a high
degree of culture and enlightenment in society. ^d At the first glance it may
be imagined to belong to the earliest ages of the world; but maturer
observation will convince us that it could only come last in the succession of
human history.

[Footnote d: It is needless to observe that I speak here of the democratic
form of government as applied to a people, not merely to a tribe.]

Charges Levied By The State Under The Rule Of The American Democracy

In all communities citizens divisible into three classes - Habits of each of
these classes in the direction of public finances - Why public expenditure
must tend to increase when the people governs - What renders the extravagance
of a democracy less to be feared in America - Public expenditure under a
democracy.

     Before we can affirm whether a democratic form of government is
economical or not, we must establish a suitable standard of comparison.  The
question would be one of easy solution if we were to attempt to draw a
parallel between a democratic republic and an absolute monarchy.  The public
expenditure would be found to be more considerable under the former than under
the latter; such is the case with all free States compared to those which are
not so.  It is certain that despotism ruins individuals by preventing them
from producing wealth, much more than by depriving them of the wealth they
have produced; it dries up the source of riches, whilst it usually respects
acquired property.  Freedom, on the contrary, engenders far more benefits than
it destroys; and the nations which are favored by free institutions invariably
find that their resources increase even more rapidly than their taxes.

     My present object is to compare free nations to each other, and to point
out the influence of democracy upon the finances of a State.

     Communities, as well as organic bodies, are subject to certain fixed
rules in their formation which they cannot evade.  They are composed of
certain elements which are common to them at all times and under all
circumstances.  The people may always be mentally divided into three distinct
classes.  The first of these classes consists of the wealthy; the second, of
those who are in easy circumstances; and the third is composed of those who
have little or no property, and who subsist more especially by the work which
they perform for the two superior orders.  The proportion of the individuals
who are included in these three divisions may vary according to the condition
of society, but the divisions themselves can never be obliterated.

     It is evident that each of these classes will exercise an influence
peculiar to its own propensities upon the administration of the finances of
the State.  If the first of the three exclusively possesses the legislative
power, it is probable that it will not be sparing of the public funds, because
the taxes which are levied on a large fortune only tend to diminish the sum of
superfluous enjoyment, and are, in point of fact, but little felt. If the
second class has the power of making the laws, it will certainly not be lavish
of taxes, because nothing is so onerous as a large impost which is levied upon
a small income.  The government of the middle classes appears to me to be the
most economical, though perhaps not the most enlightened, and certainly not
the most generous, of free governments.

     But let us now suppose that the legislative authority is vested in the
lowest orders: there are two striking reasons which show that the tendency of
the expenditure will be to increase, not to diminish.  As the great majority
of those who create the laws are possessed of no property upon which taxes can
be imposed, all the money which is spent for the community appears to be spent
to their advantage, at no cost of their own; and those who are possessed of
some little property readily find means of regulating the taxes so that they
are burdensome to the wealthy and profitable to the poor, although the rich
are unable to take the same advantage when they are in possession of the
Government.

     In countries in which the poor ^e should be exclusively invested with the
power of making the laws no great economy of public expenditure ought to be
expected: that expenditure will always be considerable; either because the
taxes do not weigh upon those who levy them, or because they are levied in
such a manner as not to weigh upon those classes.  In other words, the
government of the democracy is the only one under which the power which lays
on taxes escapes the payment of them.

[Footnote e: The word poor is used here, and throughout the remainder of this
chapter, in a relative, not in an absolute sense.  Poor men in America would
often appear rich in comparison with the poor of Europe; but they may with
propriety by styled poor in comparison with their more affluent countrymen.]

     It may be objected (but the argument has no real weight) that the true
interest of the people is indissolubly connected with that of the wealthier
portion of the community, since it cannot but suffer by the severe measures to
which it resorts.  But is it not the true interest of kings to render their
subjects happy, and the true interest of nobles to admit recruits into their
order on suitable grounds?  If remote advantages had power to prevail over the
passions and the exigencies of the moment, no such thing as a tyrannical
sovereign or an exclusive aristocracy could ever exist.

     Again, it may be objected that the poor are never invested with the sole
power of making the laws; but I reply, that wherever universal suffrage has
been established the majority of the community unquestionably exercises the
legislative authority; and if it be proved that the poor always constitute the
majority, it may be added, with perfect truth, that in the countries in which
they possess the elective franchise they possess the sole power of making
laws.  But it is certain that in all the nations of the world the greater
number has always consisted of those persons who hold no property, or of those
whose property is insufficient to exempt them from the necessity of working in
order to procure an easy subsistence.  Universal suffrage does therefore, in
point of fact, invest the poor with the government of society.

     The disastrous influence which popular authority may sometimes exercise
upon the finances of a State was very clearly seen in some of the democratic
republics of antiquity, in which the public treasure was exhausted in order to
relieve indigent citizens, or to supply the games and theatrical amusements of
the populace.  It is true that the representative system was then very
imperfectly known, and that, at the present time, the influence of popular
passion is less felt in the conduct of public affairs; but it may be believed
that the delegate will in the end conform to the principles of his
constituents, and favor their propensities as much as their interests.

     The extravagance of democracy is, however, less to be dreaded in
proportion as the people acquires a share of property, because on the one hand
the contributions of the rich are then less needed, and, on the other, it is
more difficult to lay on taxes which do not affect the interests of the lower
classes.  On this account universal suffrage would be less dangerous in France
than in England, because in the latter country the property on which taxes may
be levied is vested in fewer hands.  America, where the great majority of the
citizens possess some fortune, is in a still more favorable position than
France.

     There are still further causes which may increase the sum of public
expenditure in democratic countries.  When the aristocracy governs, the
individuals who conduct the affairs of State are exempted by their own station
in society from every kind of privation; they are contented with their
position; power and renown are the objects for which they strive; and, as they
are placed far above the obscurer throng of citizens, they do not always
distinctly perceive how the well-being of the mass of the people ought to
redound to their own honor.  They are not indeed callous to the sufferings of
the poor, but they cannot feel those miseries as acutely as if they were
themselves partakers of them.  Provided that the people appear to submit to
its lot, the rulers are satisfied, and they demand nothing further from the
Government.  An aristocracy is more intent upon the means of maintaining its
influence than upon the means of improving its condition.

     When, on the contrary, the people is invested with the supreme authority,
the perpetual sense of their own miseries impels the rulers of society to seek
for perpetual ameliorations.  A thousand different objects are subjected to
improvement; the most trivial details are sought out as susceptible of
amendment; and those changes which are accompanied with considerable expense
are more especially advocated, since the object is to render the condition of
the poor more tolerable, who cannot pay for themselves.

     Moreover, all democratic communities are agitated by an ill-defined
excitement and by a kind of feverish impatience, that engender a multitude of
innovations, almost all of which are attended with expense.

     In monarchies and aristocracies the natural taste which the rulers have
for power and for renown is stimulated by the promptings of ambition, and they
are frequently incited by these temptations to very costly undertakings. In
democracies, where the rulers labor under privations, they can only be courted
by such means as improve their well-being, and these improvements cannot take
place without a sacrifice of money.  When a people begins to reflect upon its
situation, it discovers a multitude of wants to which it had not before been
subject, and to satisfy these exigencies recourse must be had to the coffers
of the State.  Hence it arises that the public charges increase in proportion
as civilization spreads, and that imposts are augmented as knowledge pervades
the community.

     The last cause which frequently renders a democratic government dearer
than any other is, that a democracy does not always succeed in moderating its
expenditure, because it does not understand the art of being economical.  As
the designs which it entertains are frequently changed, and the agents of
those designs are still more frequently removed, its undertakings are often
ill conducted or left unfinished: in the former case the State spends sums out
of all proportion to the end which it proposes to accomplish; in the second,
the expense itself is unprofitable. ^f

[Footnote f: The gross receipts of the Treasury of the United States in 1832
were about $28,000,000; in 1870 they had risen to $411,000,000.  The gross
expenditure in 1832 was $30,000,000; in 1870, $309,000,000.]

Tendencies Of The American Democracy As Regards The Salaries Of Public
Officers

In the democracies those who establish high salaries have no chance of
profiting by them - Tendency of the American democracy to increase the
salaries of subordinate officers and to lower those of the more important
functionaries - Reason of this - Comparative statement of the salaries of
public officers in the United States and in France.

     There is a powerful reason which usually induces democracies to economize
upon the salaries of public officers.  As the number of citizens who dispense
the remuneration is extremely large in democratic countries, so the number of
persons who can hope to be benefited by the receipt of it is comparatively
small.  In aristocratic countries, on the contrary, the individuals who fix
high salaries have almost always a vague hope of profiting by them.  These
appointments may be looked upon as a capital which they create for their own
use, or at least as a resource for their children.

     It must, however, be allowed that a democratic State is most parsimonious
towards its principal agents.  In America the secondary officers are much
better paid, and the dignitaries of the administration much worse, than they
are elsewhere.

     These opposite effects result from the same cause; the people fixes the
salaries of the public officers in both cases; and the scale of remuneration
is determined by the consideration of its own wants.  It is held to be fair
that the servants of the public should be placed in the same easy
circumstances as the public itself; ^g but when the question turns upon the
salaries of the great officers of State, this rule fails, and chance alone can
guide the popular decision.  The poor have no adequate conception of the wants
which the higher classes of society may feel.  The sum which is scanty to the
rich appears enormous to the poor man whose wants do not extend beyond the
necessaries of life; and in his estimation the Governor of a State, with his
twelve or fifteen hundred dollars a year, is a very fortunate and enviable
being. ^h If you undertake to convince him that the representative of a great
people ought to be able to maintain some show of splendor in the eyes of
foreign nations, he will perhaps assent to your meaning; but when he reflects
on his own humble dwelling, and on the hard-earned produce of his wearisome
toil, he remembers all that he could do with a salary which you say is
insufficient, and he is startled or almost frightened at the sight of such
uncommon wealth.  Besides, the secondary public officer is almost on a level
with the people, whilst the others are raised above it.  The former may
therefore excite his interest, but the latter begins to arouse his envy.

[Footnote g: The easy circumstances in which secondary functionaries are
placed in the United States result also from another cause, which is
independent of the general tendencies of democracy; every kind of private
business is very lucrative, and the State would not be served at all if it did
not pay its servants.  The country is in the position of a commercial
undertaking, which is obliged to sustain an expensive competition,
notwithstanding its tastes for economy.]

[Footnote h: The State of Ohio, which contains a million of inhabitants, gives
its Governor a salary of only $1,200 a year.]

     This is very clearly seen in the United States, where the salaries seem
to decrease as the authority of those who receive them augments ^i

[Footnote i: To render this assertion perfectly evident, it will suffice to
examine the scale of salaries of the agents of the Federal Government.  I
have added the salaries attached to the corresponding officers in France
under the constitutional monarchy to complete the comparison.

                United States
          Treasury Department
Messenger ............................   $700
Clerk with lowest salary .............  1,000
Clerk with highest salary ............  1,600
Chief Clerk ..........................  2,000
Secretary of State ...................  6,000
The President ........................ 25,000

                   France
           Ministere des Finances
Hussier ........................... 1,500 fr.
Clerk with lowest salary,  1,000 to 1,800 fr.
Clerk with highest salary  3,200 to 8,600 fr.
Secretaire-general ................20,000 fr.
The Minister ......................80,000 fr.
The King ......................12,000,000 fr.

     I have perhaps done wrong in selecting France as my standard of
comparison.  In France the democratic tendencies of the nation exercise an
ever-increasing influence upon the Government, and the Chambers show a
disposition to raise the low salaries and to lower the principal ones.  Thus,
the Minister of Finance, who received 160,000 fr. under the Empire, receives
80,000 fr. in 1835: the Directeurs-generaux of Finance, who then received
50,000 fr. now receive only 20,000 fr.  [This comparison is based on the state
of things existing in France and the United States in 1831.  It has since
materially altered in both countries, but not so much as to impugn the truth
of the author's observation.]]

     Under the rule of an aristocracy it frequently happens, on the contrary,
that whilst the high officers are receiving munificent salaries, the inferior
ones have not more than enough to procure the necessaries of life.  The reason
of this fact is easily discoverable from causes very analogous to those to
which I have just alluded.  If a democracy is unable to conceive the pleasures
of the rich or to witness them without envy, an aristocracy is slow to
understand, or, to speak more correctly, is unacquainted with, the privations
of the poor.  The poor man is not (if we use the term aright) the fellow of
the rich one; but he is a being of another species.  An aristocracy is
therefore apt to care but little for the fate of its subordinate agents; and
their salaries are only raised when they refuse to perform their service for
too scanty a remuneration.

     It is the parsimonious conduct of democracy towards its principal
officers which has countenanced a supposition of far more economical
propensities than any which it really possesses.  It is true that it scarcely
allows the means of honorable subsistence to the individuals who conduct its
affairs; but enormous sums are lavished to meet the exigencies or to
facilitate the enjoyments of the people. ^j The money raised by taxation may
be better employed, but it is not saved.  In general, democracy gives largely
to the community, and very sparingly to those who govern it.  The reverse is
the case in aristocratic countries, where the money of the State is expended
to the profit of the persons who are at the head of affairs.

[Footnote j: See the American budgets for the cost of indigent citizens and
gratuitous instruction.  In 1831 $250,000 were spent in the State of New York
for the maintenance of the poor, and at least $1,000,000 were devoted to
gratuitous instruction.  (William's "New York Annual Register," 1832, pp. 205
and 243.) The State of New York contained only 1,900,000 inhabitants in the
year 1830, which is not more than double the amount of population in the
Department du Nord in France.]

Difficulty of Distinguishing The Causes Which Contribute To The Economy Of
The American Government

     We are liable to frequent errors in the research of those facts which
exercise a serious influence upon the fate of mankind, since nothing is more
difficult than to appreciate their real value.  One people is naturally
inconsistent and enthusiastic; another is sober and calculating; and these
characteristics originate in their physical constitution or in remote causes
with which we are unacquainted.

     These are nations which are fond of parade and the bustle of festivity,
and which do not regret the costly gaieties of an hour.  Others, on the
contrary, are attached to more retiring pleasures, and seem almost ashamed of
appearing to be pleased.  In some countries the highest value is set upon the
beauty of public edifices; in others the productions of art are treated with
indifference, and everything which is unproductive is looked down upon with
contempt.  In some renown, in others money, is the ruling passion.

     Independently of the laws, all these causes concur to exercise a very
powerful influence upon the conduct of the finances of the State.  If the
Americans never spend the money of the people in galas, it is not only because
the imposition of taxes is under the control of the people, but because the
people takes no delight in public rejoicings.  If they repudiate all ornament
from their architecture, and set no store on any but the more practical and
homely advantages, it is not only because they live under democratic
institutions, but because they are a commercial nation.  The habits of private
life are continued in public; and we ought carefully to distinguish that
economy which depends upon their institutions from that which is the natural
result of their manners and customs.

Whether The Expenditure Of The United States Can Be Compared To That Of
France

Two points to be established in order to estimate the extent of the public
charges, viz., the national wealth and the rate of taxation - The wealth and
the charges of France not accurately known - Why the wealth and charges of the
Union cannot be accurately known - Researches of the author with a view to
discover the amount of taxation of Pennsylvania - General symptoms which may
serve to indicate the amount of the public charges in a given nation - Result
of this investigation for the Union.

     Many attempts have recently been made in France to compare the public
expenditure of that country with the expenditure of the United States; all
these attempts have, however, been unattended by success, and a few words will
suffice to show that they could not have had a satisfactory result.

     In order to estimate the amount of the public charges of a people two
preliminaries are indispensable: it is necessary, in the first place, to know
the wealth of that people; and in the second, to learn what portion of that
wealth is devoted to the expenditure of the State.  To show the amount of
taxation without showing the resources which are destined to meet the demand,
is to undertake a futile labor; for it is not the expenditure, but the
relation of the expenditure to the revenue, which it is desirable to know.

     The same rate of taxation which may easily be supported by a wealthy
contributor will reduce a poor one to extreme misery.  The wealth of nations
is composed of several distinct elements, of which population is the first,
real property the second, and personal property the third.  The first of these
three elements may be discovered without difficulty.  Amongst civilized
nations it is easy to obtain an accurate census of the inhabitants; but the
two others cannot be determined with so much facility.  It is difficult to
take an exact account of all the lands in a country which are under
cultivation, with their natural or their acquired value; and it is still more
impossible to estimate the entire personal property which is at the disposal
of a nation, and which eludes the strictest analysis by the diversity and the
number of shapes under which it may occur.  And, indeed, we find that the most
ancient civilized nations of Europe, including even those in which the
administration is most central, have not succeeded, as yet, in determining the
exact condition of their wealth.

     In America the attempt has never been made; for how would such an
investigation be possible in a country where society has not yet settled into
habits of regularity and tranquillity; where the national Government is not
assisted by a multiple of agents whose exertions it can command and direct to
one sole end; and where statistics are not studied, because no one is able to
collect the necessary documents, or to find time to peruse them?  Thus the
primary elements of the calculations which have been made in France cannot be
obtained in the Union; the relative wealth of the two countries is unknown;
the property of the former is not accurately determined, and no means exist of
computing that of the latter.

     I consent, therefore, for the sake of the discussion, to abandon this
necessary term of the comparison, and I confine myself to a computation of the
actual amount of taxation, without investigating the relation which subsists
between the taxation and the revenue.  But the reader will perceive that my
task has not been facilitated by the limits which I here lay down for my
researches.

     It cannot be doubted that the central administration of France, assisted
by all the public officers who are at its disposal, might determine with
exactitude the amount of the direct and indirect taxes levied upon the
citizens.  But this investigation, which no private individual can undertake,
has not hitherto been completed by the French Government, or, at least, its
results have not been made public.  We are acquainted with the sum total of
the charges of the State; we know the amount of the departmental expenditure;
but the expenses of the communal divisions have not been computed, and the
amount of the public expenses of France is consequently unknown.

     If we now turn to America, we shall perceive that the difficulties are
multiplied and enhanced.  The Union publishes an exact return of the amount of
its expenditure; the budgets of the four and twenty States furnish similar
returns of their revenues; but the expenses incident to the affairs of the
counties and the townships are unknown. ^k

[Footnote k: The Americans, as we have seen, have four separate budgets, the
Union, the States, the Counties, and the Townships having each severally their
own.  During my stay in America I made every endeavor to discover the amount
of the public expenditure in the townships and counties of the principal
States of the Union, and I readily obtained the budget of the larger
townships, but I found it quite impossible to procure that of the smaller
ones.  I possess, however, some documents relating to county expenses, which,
although incomplete, are still curious.  I have to thank Mr. Richards, Mayor
of Philadelphia, for the budgets of thirteen of the counties of Pennsylvania,
viz., Lebanon, Centre, Franklin, Fayette, Montgomery, Luzerne, Dauphin,
Butler, Alleghany, Columbia, Northampton, Northumberland, and Philadelphia,
for the year 1830.  Their population at that time consisted of 495,207
inhabitants.  On looking at the map of Pennsylvania, it will be seen that
these thirteen counties are scattered in every direction, and so generally
affected by the causes which usually influence the condition of a country,
that they may easily be supposed to furnish a correct average of the financial
state of the counties of Pennsylvania in general; and thus, upon reckoning
that the expenses of these counties amounted in the year 1830 to about
$361,650, or nearly 75 cents for each inhabitant, and calculating that each of
them contributed in the same year about $2.55 towards the Union, and about 75
cents to the State of Pennsylvania, it appears that they each contributed as
their share of all the public expenses (except those of the townships) the sum
of $4.05.  This calculation is doubly incomplete, as it applies only to a
single year and to one part of the public charges; but it has at least the
merit of not being conjectural.]

     The authority of the Federal government cannot oblige the provincial
governments to throw any light upon this point; and even if these governments
were inclined to afford their simultaneous co-operation, it may be doubted
whether they possess the means of procuring a satisfactory answer.
Independently of the natural difficulties of the task, the political
organization of the country would act as a hindrance to the success of their
efforts.  The county and town magistrates are not appointed by the authorities
of the State, and they are not subjected to their control.  It is therefore
very allowable to suppose that, if the State was desirous of obtaining the
returns which we require, its design would be counteracted by the neglect of
those subordinate officers whom it would be obliged to employ. ^l It is, in
point of fact, useless to inquire what the Americans might do to forward this
inquiry, since it is certain that they have hitherto done nothing at all.
There does not exist a single individual at the present day, in America or in
Europe, who can inform us what each citizen of the Union annually contributes
to the public charges of the nation. ^m

[Footnote l: Those who have attempted to draw a comparison between the
expenses of France and America have at once perceived that no such comparison
could be drawn between the total expenditure of the two countries; but they
have endeavored to contrast detached portions of this expenditure.  It may
readily be shown that this second system is not at all less defective than the
first.  If I attempt to compare the French budget with the budget of the
Union, it must be remembered that the latter embraces much fewer objects than
then central Government of the former country, and that the expenditure must
consequently be much smaller.  If I contrast the budgets of the Departments
with those of the States which constitute the Union, it must be observed that,
as the power and control exercised by the States is much greater than that
which is exercised by the Departments, their expenditure is also more
considerable.  As for the budgets of the counties, nothing of the kind occurs
in the French system of finances; and it is, again, doubtful whether the
corresponding expenses should be referred to the budget of the State or to
those of the municipal divisions.  Municipal expenses exist in both countries,
but they are not always analogous.  In America the townships discharge a
variety of offices which are reserved in France to the Departments or to the
State.  It may, moreover, be asked what is to be understood by the municipal
expenses of America.  The organization of the municipal bodies or townships
differs in the several States.  Are we to be guided by what occurs in New
England or in Georgia, in Pennsylvania or in the State of Illinois?  A kind of
analogy may very readily be perceived between certain budgets in the two
countries; but as the elements of which they are composed always differ more
or less, no fair comparison can be instituted between them.  [The same
difficulty exists, perhaps to a greater degree at the present time, when the
taxation of America has largely increased. - 1874.]]

[Footnote m: Even if we knew the exact pecuniary contributions of every French
and American citizen to the coffers of the State, we should only come at a
portion of the truth.  Governments do not only demand supplies of money, but
they call for personal services, which may be looked upon as equivalent to a
given sum.  When a State raises an army, besides the pay of the troops, which
is furnished by the entire nation, each soldier must give up his time, the
value of which depends on the use he might make of it if he were not in the
service.  The same remark applies to the militia; the citizen who is in the
militia devotes a certain portion of valuable time to the maintenance of the
public peace, and he does in reality surrender to the State those earnings
which he is prevented from gaining.  Many other instances might be cited in
addition to these.  The governments of France and of America both levy taxes
of this kind, which weigh upon the citizens; but who can estimate with
accuracy their relative amount in the two countries?

     This, however, is not the last of the difficulties which prevent us from
comparing the expenditure of the Union with that of France.  The French
Government contracts certain obligations which do not exist in America, and
vice versa.  The French Government pays the clergy; in America the voluntary
principle prevails.  In America there is a legal provision for the poor; in
France they are abandoned to the charity of the public.  The French public
officers are paid by a fixed salary; in America they are allowed certain
perquisites.  In France contributions in kind take place on very few roads; in
America upon almost all the thoroughfares: in the former country the roads are
free to all travellers; in the latter turnpikes abound.  All these differences
in the manner in which contributions are levied in the two countries enhance
the difficulty of comparing their expenditure; for there are certain expenses
which the citizens would not be subject to, or which would at any rate be much
less considerable, if the State did not take upon itself to act in the name of
the public.]

     Hence we must conclude that it is no less difficult to compare the social
expenditure than it is to estimate the relative wealth of France and America.
I will even add that it would be dangerous to attempt this comparison; for
when statistics are not based upon computations which are strictly accurate,
they mislead instead of guiding aright.  The mind is easily imposed upon by
the false affectation of exactness, which prevails even in the misstatements
of science, and it adopts with confidence errors which are dressed in the
forms of mathematical truth.

     We abandon, therefore, our numerical investigation, with the hope of
meeting with data of another kind.  In the absence of positive documents, we
may form an opinion as to the proportion which the taxation of a people bears
to its real prosperity, by observing whether its external appearance is
flourishing; whether, after having discharged the calls of the State, the poor
man retains the means of subsistence, and the rich the means of enjoyment; and
whether both classes are contented with their position, seeking, however, to
ameliorate it by perpetual exertions, so that industry is never in want of
capital, nor capital unemployed by industry.  The observer who draws his
inferences from these signs will, undoubtedly, be led to the conclusion that
the American of the United States contributes a much smaller portion of his
income to the State than the citizen of France.  Nor, indeed, can the result
be otherwise.

     A portion of the French debt is the consequence of two successive
invasions; and the Union has no similar calamity to fear.  A nation placed
upon the continent of Europe is obliged to maintain a large standing army; the
isolated position of the Union enables it to have only 6,000 soldiers. The
French have a fleet of 300 sail; the Americans have 52 vessels. ^n How, then,
can the inhabitants of the Union be called upon to contribute as largely as
the inhabitants of France?  No parallel can be drawn between the finances of
two countries so differently situated.

[Footnote n: See the details in the Budget of the French Minister of Marine;
and for America, the National Calendar of 1833, p. 228.  [But the public debt
of the United States in 1870, caused by the Civil War, amounted to
$2,480,672,427; that of France was more than doubled by the extravagance of
the Second Empire and by the war of 1870.]]

     It is by examining what actually takes place in the Union, and not by
comparing the Union with France, that we may discover whether the American
Government is really economical.  On casting my eyes over the different
republics which form the confederation, I perceive that their Governments lack
perseverance in their undertakings, and that they exercise no steady control
over the men whom they employ.  Whence I naturally infer that they must often
spend the money of the people to no purpose, or consume more of it than is
really necessary to their undertakings.  Great efforts are made, in accordance
with the democratic origin of society, to satisfy the exigencies of the lower
orders, to open the career of power to their endeavors, and to diffuse
knowledge and comfort amongst them.  The poor are maintained, immense sums are
annually devoted to public instruction, all services whatsoever are
remunerated, and the most subordinate agents are liberally paid.  If this kind
of government appears to me to be useful and rational, I am nevertheless
constrained to admit that it is expensive.

     Wherever the poor direct public affairs and dispose of the national
resources, it appears certain that, as they profit by the expenditure of the
State, they are apt to augment that expenditure.

     I conclude, therefore, without having recourse to inaccurate
computations, and without hazarding a comparison which might prove incorrect,
that the democratic government of the Americans is not a cheap government, as
is sometimes asserted; and I have no hesitation in predicting that, if the
people of the United States is ever involved in serious difficulties, its
taxation will speedily be increased to the rate of that which prevails in the
greater part of the aristocracies and the monarchies of Europe. ^o

[Footnote o: [That is precisely what has since occurred.]]